If It\u27s Hardly Worth Doing, It\u27s Hardly Worth Doing Right: How the NLRA\u27s Goals Are Defeated Through Inadequate Remedies by Worster, Robert M., III
University of Richmond Law Review
Volume 38 | Issue 4 Article 9
5-1-2004
If It's Hardly Worth Doing, It's Hardly Worth
Doing Right: How the NLRA's Goals Are Defeated
Through Inadequate Remedies
Robert M. Worster III
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview
Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons, Law and Economics Commons, Law and
Politics Commons, and the Legislation Commons
This Casenote is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Richmond Law Review by an authorized editor of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.
Recommended Citation
Robert M. Worster III, If It's Hardly Worth Doing, It's Hardly Worth Doing Right: How the NLRA's Goals Are Defeated Through Inadequate
Remedies, 38 U. Rich. L. Rev. 1073 (2004).
Available at: https://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview/vol38/iss4/9
IF IT'S HARDLY WORTH DOING, IT'S HARDLY WORTH
DOING RIGHT: HOW THE NLRA'S GOALS ARE
DEFEATED THROUGH INADEQUATE REMEDIES
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1935, the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA" or "Act")
was signed into law with the purpose of promoting industrial
peace and tranquility between employees and employers.1 It
sought to encourage cooperative and collective bargaining and to
deter employer and union unfair labor practices.2 Unfortunately,
these important goals cannot currently be realized due to the in-
adequate remedies provided by the Act. This Comment seeks to
expose the inadequacy of the NLRA to fulfill its mandate, while
recommending remedy enhancements to allow the promises of the
NLRA to be fulfilled. Undoubtedly, strengthening the available
remedies under the NLRA will better protect labor; more impor-
tantly, it will also improve adherence to the NLRA itself. While
the appropriate degree of protection to be afforded workers is a
debatable issue, with valid arguments advanced by both labor
and management, whether the NLRA's protections should be
adequate to fulfill that ultimate balance is not. Section II de-
scribes the original intentions and procedural mechanisms of the
NLRA. Section III discusses commonly ordered remedies and how
they have each failed to fully effectuate the NLRA's purposes.
Section IV recommends enhanced remedies to alleviate the Act's
shortcomings.
1073
1. See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2000); NLRB v. Peter
Paul, Inc., 467 F.2d 700, 702 (9th Cir. 1972).
2. See Peter Paul, 467 F.2d at 702.
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II. THE NLRA
A. Purposes of the NLRA
The NLRA was enacted to govern most labor relations between
employers and employees that affect interstate commerce. 3 Its
"principal objectives" are to "promote peace and tranquility be-
tween labor and management."4
The Act guarantees "employees" the right to "form, join, or as-
sist labor organizations"; to bargain collectively with their em-
ployer; and to "engage in other concerted activities for the pur-
pose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection."'
The term "employee" is generally defined to include "any em-
ployee" and has been interpreted to include undocumented aliens
employed within the United States.6 It is an unfair labor practice
to discriminate regarding any condition of employment based on
an employee's membership or support of any labor organization.7
Of most importance to the individual worker, an employee may
not be fired or otherwise punished for seeking to better his or her
working conditions through concerted activities.'
B. The Methods Provided By the NLRA to Achieve its Purposes
1. Equalized Bargaining Power Through Collective Bargaining
The legislative history of the NLRA shows that Congress rec-
ognized that there is no true freedom to contract between "a sin-
gle workman, with only his job between his family and ruin" and
"a tremendous organization having thousands of workers."9 The
Act sought to create that freedom of contract, to maintain indus-
3. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (2000). The NLRA does not govern airlines, railroads, ag-
riculture, and government employees. Id. § 152(2), (3).
4. Peter Paul., 467 F.2d at 702; see also Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg.
Co., 380 U.S. 263, 271 (1965).
5. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2000).
6. Id. § 152(3); Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 891 (1984) (noting that the
NLRB "has consistently held that undocumented aliens are 'employees' within the mean-
ing of § 2(3) of the Act").
7. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (a)(3) (2000).
8. See id. § 158(a)(4).
9. 78 CONG. REC. 3679 (1934).
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trial peace, and to eliminate industrial strife by encouraging col-
lective bargaining.0 It was thought that a "free opportunity for
negotiation with accredited representatives" would "promote in-
dustrial peace"" and be the "keystone of the federal scheme."12
2. Procedural Mechanisms of the NLRA
The procedural mechanisms of the NLRA are invoked where an
unfair labor practice is committed and reported within six
months. First, an unfair labor practice charge is filed with the lo-
cal National Labor Relations field office, which investigates the
charge and determines whether the NLRA has been violated. 3 If
the charge has reasonable merit the regional office will encourage
a voluntary settlement between the parties or file a formal com-
plaint against the employer or labor organization; otherwise, the
regional director will dismiss the charges, subject to appeal. 4
These complaints are adjudicated before an administrative law
judge and may be appealed to the five-member National Labor
Relations Board ("NLRB" or "Board"). 5 A Board decision may
then be appealed to any federal court of appeals having jurisdic-
tion, and ultimately may even reach the Supreme Court of the
United States. 6
10. See Electromation Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 990, 994 n.18 (1992).
11. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 45 (1937).
12. Local 174, Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of America v. Lucas
Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 104 (1962). In addition to collective bargaining, the NLRA strives
to remove "recognized sources of industrial strife" such as employer discrimination as to
wages, hours, and other working conditions. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2000).
13. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD AND
You: REPRESENTATION CASES, available at http://www.nlrb.gov/nlrb/legal/brochures (last
visited Mar. 29, 2004) [hereinafter NLRB, REPRESENTATION CASES]; NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS BOARD, THE NLRB: WHAT IT IS, WHAT IT DOES, available at
http://www.nlrb.gov/nlrb/legal/brochures (last visited Mar. 29, 2004) [hereinafter NLRB,
WHAT IT IS].
14. See NLRB, REPRESENTATION CASES, supra note 13.
15. See NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
AND YOU: UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES, available at http://www.nlrb.gov/nlrd/legal/brochures
(last visited Mar. 29, 2004) [hereinafter NLRB, UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES].
16. See id. Although highly relevant to individual workers and employment tranquil-
ity generally, the NLRB is only charged with interpreting and enforcing the NLRA and
does not govern the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Public Contracts Act, the Service Con-
tract Act, the Davis-Bacon Act, or the Safety Standards Act. See id.
2004] 1075
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3. Available Remedies Under the NLRA
"It remains the historic purpose of the Act to promote indus-
trial peace by providing the means for protecting the rights of
employers, employees, and unions in their relations with each
other."7 To remain flexible enough to respond to changing condi-
tions, Congress granted the NLRB "considerable discretion to
fashion remedies that would enable it to carry out its task."8
Specifically, section 10(c) of the NLRA gives the NLRB the man-
date "to devise remedies that effectuate the policies of the Act,
subject only to limited judicial review." 9
The remedies currently utilized are solely restorative. Access
and notice remedies are frequently ordered where an employer
has committed an unfair labor practice or hampered an em-
ployee's free choice in seeking representation.2" "Access remedies"
allow unions to communicate with employees free from employer
reprisals, whereas "notice remedies" inform "employees of their
statutory rights and the legal limits on the [elmployer's conduct"
while assuring them that "further violations will not occur."21
"Make whole" remedies such as backpay, reinstatement, and
conditional reinstatement are also available where an employee
has been discriminatorily discharged.22 These remedies seek to
ensure that "the victims of unfair labor practices" are made whole
and that the violators are "required to restore the status quo. "23
17. Leonard R. Page, NLRB Remedies: Where are They Going?, Address Before the
University of Richmond School of Law (Apr. 10, 2000), available at http://www.
nlrb.gov/nlrb/press/releases/r2388.asp (last visited Mar. 29, 2004) (emphasis added) [here-
inafter Page, NLRB Remedies].
18. Id.
19. Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 898-99 (1984); see National Labor Rela-
tions Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (2000).
20. See Teamsters Local 115 v. NLRB, 640 F.2d 392, 399 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
21. Id. at 399-400.
22. See Page, NLRB Remedies, supra note 17.
23. The National Labor Relations Board: Recent Trends and Their Implications, Hear-
ing Before the Subcom. on Employer-Employee Relations of the House Comm. on Educ. and
the Workforce, 106th Cong. 56 (2000) (written statement of Leonard R. Page, General
Counsel, National Labor Relations Board), microformed on CIS NO. H341-8 (Cong. Info.
Serv.) [hereinafter Page, Recent Trends].
[Vol. 38:10731076
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III. THE NLRA's INADEQUATE AND INEFFECTIVE REMEDIES
Despite the number of remedies available under the NLRA,
they have collectively proven ineffective at creating industrial
tranquility. Former General Counsel Leonard Page observed that
while the NLRA is over sixty-five years old, there are "rather out-
rageous and pervasive violations on a regular basis"24 and that
"for a mature statute the growing incidence of discipline for union
activity is disturbing."25 Yet, where the Board or the appellate
courts have sought to fill the remedial void, the Supreme Court
has consistently held that they have "plainly exceeded [their] lim-
ited authority under the Act."26
Leonard Page explained that "the need to obtain effective
remedies is clearly exemplified in the cases that involve [unfair
labor practices] committed in response to an employee organizing
campaign."27 However, despite the availability of reinstatement,
backpay, cease and desist orders, union access, and posted notice
remedies to counter these unfair labor practices, they remain
largely ineffective.2"
While Mr. Page may be seen as controversial to some, Chief
Justice William H. Rehnquist and the Supreme Court of the
United States have also recognized that the remedies of the
NLRA are wholly inadequate to effectuate the purposes of the
Act, and have repeatedly invited Congress to cure this defi-
ciency.29 For example, in the 1984 case of Sure-Tan, Inc. v.
NLRB,3° the Court noted that "[a]ny perceived deficiencies in the
NLRA's existing remedial arsenal can only be addressed by con-
24. Id. at 57.
25. Page, NLRB Remedies, supra note 17.
26. Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 904-05 (1984).
27. Page, Recent Trends, supra note 23, at 59.
28. See id. at 56-59; see also Richard A. Bales, The Discord Between Collective Bar-
gaining and Individual Employment Rights: Theoretical Origins and a Proposed Solution,
77 B.U.L. REV. 687, 739 n.284 (1997) ("Reinstatement and back pay are woefully inade-
quate remedies for a wrongful discharge."); Charles J. Morris, A Blueprint For Reform of
the National Labor Relations Act, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 517, 518 (1994) ("The National La-
bor Relations Act... is broken and needs fixing."); Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep: Secur-
ing Workers' Rights to Self-Organization Under the NLRA, 96 HARv. L. REV. 1769, 1787-
91 (1983) (criticizing monetary backpay as an inadequate remedy).
29. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 152 (2002); see Sure-
Tan, Inc., 467 U.S. at 904.
30. 467 U.S. 883 (1984).
2004] 1077
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gressional action.' In 2002, Chief Justice Rehnquist reaffirmed
this commitment to judicial restraint, despite the glaring need for
the NLRA's reform, in Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v.
NLRB.32 Despite these incessant invitations to reform the Act,
the remedies available under the NLRA have never been ex-
panded by Congress.
A. Cease and Desist Remedies
In Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Chief Justice Rehnquist ex-
plained that the NLRB's "[1]ack of authority to award backpay
does not mean that the employer gets off scot-free. The Board
"3[there ha[d] already imposed other significant sanctions ....
The first of the "significant sanctions" that the Chief Justice re-
ferred to was a "cease and desist" order.34 Under this order, the
remedy for violating the NLRA is an order from the NLRB direct-
ing that the same law not be broken a second time. Failure to
comply with the Board's order may result in the Board asking the
Judiciary to enforce that order and again directing the employer
to cease and desist from violating the NLRA a third time. If cer-
tiorari is granted, the Supreme Court of the United States may
then issue what the Chief Justice has dubbed a "significant sanc-
tion[]"F-a cease and desist order.35 This is reminiscent of the un-
armed police officer's order to "stop or I will say stop again."
B. Notice Remedies
The second of the "significant sanctions" that Chief Justice
Rehnquist referred to in Hoffman Plastic Compounds was an or-
der demanding the employer to post, for sixty days, a written no-
tice in the workplace detailing the violation and the employer's
pledge to never recommit the offense.36 This is a routine remedy
when an employer has intimidated employees or otherwise com-
31. See id. at 904.
32. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc., 535 U.S. at 152. (stating that the conclusion of







mitted an unfair labor practice37 and is intended to make each
employee "individually aware of his statutory rights and that his
exercise of such rights will be respected. '3' Despite these noble in-
tentions, notice orders have not "made victims whole, restored the
status quo or prevented further unfair labor practice [s]."' What
is inherently offensive about this remedy is that it acknowledges
that an employee's rights have been violated, but then offers a so-
lution so inconsequential to both the employer and the employee
as to be insulting to the employee and merely inconvenient to the
employer.4' The entire notion that a "notice" is capable of making
an aggrieved employee whole or deterring a willfully violative
employer from committing future offenses is at best comical. Fur-
ther, calling this remedy a "significant sanction" dilutes the
promises of the NLRA by paying them only pacifying lip service.
Imagine if the Environmental Protection Agency relied upon
notice remedies and cease and desist orders rather than hefty and
intimidating fines. "Pardon me corporate polluter, please stop
dumping toxins into our drinking water or we will require you to
conspicuously post a notice detailing how you violated the Clean
Water Act. And if you refuse we will order you to cease and desist
polluting and may even ask an appellate court to enforce our or-
der-eventually!" One is left to wonder if there would even be wa-
ter left in the nation's rivers by the time a court's contempt orders
could be imposed.
The NLRB is well aware that notice remedies are often "insuf-
ficient to dissipate the effects of... extensive and flagrant unfair
labor practices."4' Where "the mere posting of notices" fails to
serve the purposes of the Act, notices are ordered read to the em-
ployees by the employers themselves.4 1 While this practice is de-
signed to remove the "lingering atmosphere of fear," it lacks the
teeth to truly reassure the employee that the employer will not
37. See generally THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAw 1633-94 (Charles J. Morris et al. eds,
2d ed. 1983) (discussing the general principles and applications of NLRB orders and reme-
dies).
38. Three Sisters Sportswear Co., 312 N.L.R.B. 853, 880 (1993).
39. Page, Recent Trends, supra note 23, at 56-57.
40. But see John W. Teeter, Jr., Fair Notice: Assuring Victims of Unfair Labor Prac-
tices that Their Rights Will Be Respected, 63 UMKC L. REV. 1, 2 (1994) (arguing that "em-
ployers should always be required to read notices aloud to their workers as a standard
remedy for violations of the Act").
41. Loray Corp., 184 N.L.R.B. 557, 558 (1970).
42. Id.
2004] 1079
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repeat the unfair labor practice.43 Further, the order to read a no-
tice is often negatively described by employers-it was as if the
NLRB "'slapped our hands just like we were naughty little chil-
dren."'44 Many courts have justified their refusal to enforce these
orders, despite "massive and deliberate violations of the Act,"
45
explaining that a "public reading... would.., be humiliating
and degrading to the employer" and "inevitably poison the future
relations between company and union and be a source of continu-
ing resentment."46 While the arguments for and against manda-
tory notice readings both have merit, the fact that available
remedies are so sparse as to require this debate is distressing.47
C. Reinstatement Remedies
Another common remedial order where an employee has been
discriminatorily discharged is reinstatement." This is thought to
"best effectuate[ ] the purposes and policies of the Act because it
restores the employee to the circumstances that existed prior to
the.., unlawful action, or that would be in effect had there been
no unlawful action."49 However, "court proceedings actually result
in reinstatement in only a small number of exceptional cases."5 °
Additionally, while "over the last thirty years, discharges for un-
ion activity have tripled," most employees who have suffered dis-
crimination decline reinstatement.5' This can partially be ex-
plained by lengthy proceedings 52 and the fact that "employers pay
no price for deliberate delays and frivolous appeals."53 Because of
43. See Teamsters Local 115 v. NLRB, 640 F.2d 392, 399 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (citation
omitted).
44. Scott's, Inc., 159 N.L.R.B. 1795, 1797-98 (1966).
45. Id. at 1807.
46. Int'l Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. NLRB, 383 F.2d 230, 233-34 (D.C.
Cir. 1967).
47. See generally Teeter, supra note 40 (discussing the debate over whether notice or-
ders should be required to be read aloud by employers).
48. Id. at 1.
49. Page, NLRB Remedies, supra note 17.
50. Michael Kittner & Thomas C. Kohler, Conditioning Expectations: The Protection of
the Employment Bond in German and American Law, 21 CoMP. LAB. L. & POLy J. 263,
328 (2000).
51. Leonard Page, New Directions for the Next National Labor Relations Board, 2001
L. REV. M.S.U.-D.C.L. 1063, 1066 (2001).
52. Kittner & Kohler, supra note 50, at 328.
53. Worker's Freedom of Association: Obstacles to Forming a Union: Hearing Before
the Senate Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor, and Pensions, 107th Cong. 41 (2002) (state-
1080 [Vol. 38:1073
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the Board's tremendous caseload, the numerous levels of appel-
late review provided by the Act, and the frequency of tactical de-
lays, the procedural mechanisms of the NLRA are simply inept at
providing timely relief.14 Further, an employee's desire to work
for an employer who has already committed an unfair labor prac-
tice once and showed a willingness to fight the Board's ordered
remedy, is understandably low. However, many occupations util-
ize specialized skill sets that do not easily transfer to other occu-
pations or other employers-necessitating this specific remedy to
effectuate the policies of the NLRA despite its overall lackluster
effectiveness.
More troubling than the inability of a reinstatement order to
make the employee whole is the fact that it is unavailable as a
remedy to some workers despite their inclusion as "employees"
under the NLRA's so-called protections. For example, in Sure-
Tan,55 a United States employer illegally employed Mexican na-
tionals in two small leather processing firms.56 These workers
later elected a union as their bargaining representative. Sure-
Tan's president, John Surak, interrogated the employees who en-
gaged in the union organizing campaign as to their immigration
status and reported the foreign nationals to the Immigration and
Naturalization Service ("INS").5" Additionally, he filed objections
to the election, challenging the employees' right to vote for a un-
ion based on their immigration status.59 The workers were subse-
quently deported; however, when the NLRB investigated the elec-
tion objections it discovered that Surak had known about the
illegal status months before the election and had contacted the
ment of Kenneth Roth, Executive Director, Human Rights Watch), microformed on CIS
No. 5431-15 (Cong. Info. Serv.) [hereinafter Roth, Worker's Freedom].
54. For example, "[t]he delay associated with remands can be an additional incentive
to appeal. Remands almost always occasion significant delay .... Measured conserva-
tively, this delay amounts to an average of sixteen months at the agency level alone and
exceeds four years in 10% of the cases." Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chev-
ron Station: An Empirical Study of Federal Administrative Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 984, 1012
(1990); see generally Ray Marshall, The American Industrial Relations System in a Time of
Change, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 829, 839 (1987) (noting that while the NLRA outlaws many
delay tactics, the penalties are so weak that the law is often ignored).
55. Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883 (1984).
56. Id. at 886.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 886-87.
59. Id. at 887.
20041 1081
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INS "'solely because the employees supported the Union,"' in di-
rect retaliation, and with clear anti-union animus."
Although reinstatement was initially ordered, the Court held
that "reinstatement would be proper only if the discharged em-
ployees were legally present and free to be employed in the
United States when they presented themselves for reinstate-
ment."1 The Court acknowledged that
[ilf undocumented alien employees were excluded from participation
in union activities and from protections against employer intimida-
tion, there would be created a subclass of workers without a compa-
rable stake in the collective goals of their legally resident co-workers,
thereby eroding the unity of all the employees and impeding effective
collective bargaining.
6 2
Despite their inclusion under the NLRA as "employees," rein-
statement remained unavailable to the affected employees in
light of the workers' unlawful status and the fact that they were
no longer in the country."
Although the Board's cease and desist order was enforced by
the Supreme Court, the order afforded little deterrence to the
employer and no meaningful remedy to the workers. Further, this
ruling rendered future undocumented workers particularly vul-
nerable to an employer's unfair labor practices and illuminated
how the removal of even a single available remedy renders the
Act incapable of fulfilling its purpose.'
60. Id. at 887-88. The employer's action was in violation of section 8(a)(1) and (3)
which make it an "unfair labor practice" for an employer to interfere with employees in the
exercise of the rights regarding any condition of employment or to "discourage member-
ship in any labor organization." Id. at 888 n.1; see also 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158(a)(1), (a)(3)
(2000).
61. Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 889.
62. Id. at 892.
63. Id. at 903.
64. Interestingly, in Sure-Tan the Court discussed whether enforcement of the NLRA
is consistent with the policies of the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA") without in-
cluding any similar discussion as to the effect on the NLRA. See id. at 892-94. In fact, the
primary goals of the NLRA-industrial peace and stability-were never even mentioned
by the Court in reaching a decision that so clearly affected the ability of the NLRA to ful-
fill its mandate. See id. at 892.
[Vol. 38:10731082
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D. Compensatory Backpay Remedies
Routinely coupled with orders of reinstatement are backpay
awards, and again, they are largely inconsequential despite being
one of the most powerful remedies in the NLRA's arsenal.65
The major weakness of backpay awards as a remedy for unfair
labor practices is that they require the aggrieved employee to
mitigate the damages through the employee's earnings from other
employment. 6 Because the vast majority of workers are not in a
position to sustain years of litigation without finding other em-
ployment, they rationally seek the best paying jobs they can find.
Any earnings from this new employment are deducted from the
backpay award, leaving the employer to pay only the backpay less
these interim earnings.67 Where an employee finds comparable or
better work there is little incentive to even report the unfair labor
practice and no meaningful economic deterrent to the employer
even if the employee does. Kenneth Roth, the Executive Director
of Human Rights Watch, testified that "[1]abor law is so weak
that companies often treat the minor penalties as a routine cost of
doing business, not a deterrent against violations.""
This problem was exposed in Hoffman Plastic Compounds, dis-
cussed above, where the Court held that the NLRB may never or-
der the remedy of backpay where the victim of an unfair labor
practice is an undocumented worker.69 There, in May 1988, an
undocumented worker named Jose Castro gave false documenta-
tion to Hoffman Plastic Compunds, Inc. to illegally gain employ-
ment with its California factory.7" Shortly thereafter, the United
Rubber, Cork, Linoleum, and Plastic Workers of America ("AFL-
CIO") began a union-organizing campaign.7 A month later, in re-
taliation for their efforts in the organizing campaign, Castro and
65. See id. at 902.
66. See id. at 901.
67. See id.
68. Roth, Worker's Freedom, supra note 53, at 41.
69. See Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 149 (2002) (holding
that "awarding backpay to illegal aliens runs counter to policies underlying [the Immigra-
tion Reform and Control Act], policies the Board has no authority to enforce or administer.
Therefore, as we have consistently held in like circumstances, the award lies beyond the
bounds of the Board's remedial discretion.").
70. Id. at 140.
71. Id.
20041 1083
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four of his co-workers were laid off. 2 A meritorious unfair labor
practice charge was subsequently filed with the local field office
on behalf of these workers. 3
In January 1992, four years after the incident, the NLRB heid
that Hoffman had discriminated, against Castro "to rid itself of
known union supporters" in violation of the NLRA. 74 A cease and
desist order was issued along with a sixty-day remedial notice.75
Additionally, Hoffman was ordered to offer reinstatement and
backpay to the affected employees. 6
In June 1993, Castro testified at an Administrative Law Judge
Compliance Hearing that he was an undocumented worker and
had never legally been allowed to work within the United
States.77 The Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") held that it could
not order backpay because of Sure-Tan,7 especially given Castro's
use of fraudulent documents to gain employment in violation of
the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 ("IRCA"). 9
In September 1998, ten years after the unfair labor practice ac-
tually occurred, the NLRB reversed the ALJ's decision and or-
dered backpay.8 0 The NLRB decided that "the most effective way
to accommodate and further the immigration policies embodied in
the [IRCA] is to provide the protections and remedies of the
[NLRA] to undocumented workers in the same manner as to
other employees.""' Therefore, backpay was calculated from the
time of the unfair labor practice to the time the employer learned
of the immigration status.8 2 The Board reasoned that once the
employer was on notice that it could no longer employ the un-
documented workers because of the undocumented immigration
72. Id.
73. Id. at 140-41.
74. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc., 306 N.L.R.B. 100, 100 (1992). Discrimination
during an organizing campaign is a violation of section 8(a)(3) and an unfair labor practice
under section 8(a)(1). See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (3) (2000).
75. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, 306 N.L.R.B. at 107-08.
76. Id. at 107.
77. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc., 314 N.L.R.B. 683, 685 (1994).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc., 326 N.L.R.B. 1060, 1060 (1998).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1062.
1084 [Vol. 38:1073
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status, the termination was mandated and any anti-union moti-
vations became irrelevant. 3
In 2002, fourteen years after the unfair labor practice occurred,
the Supreme Court of the United States reversed the NLRB's de-
cision, holding that undocumented workers cannot receive back-
pay under the NLRA-despite being "employees" with the protec-
tions of the NLRA-even when they are illegally fired or are
otherwise the victim of an unfair labor practice.' Where undocu-
mented workers gained employment through fraud and where
they could never have lawfully earned the wages that backpay
would provide as a remedy, backpay would not be allowed despite
the protections afforded by the NLRA. 5
The Court supported its refusal to afford these employees the
protections due them under the NLRA by explaining that "com-
bating the employment of illegal aliens [is] central to 'the policy"'
of IRCA and this policy must be considered in applying labor
law. 6 The Court further noted that in response to the Court's ear-
lier decision in Sure-Tan, Congress had enacted IRCA which
made it unlawful for an employer to knowingly hire an undocu-
mented alien to work within the United States 7 and thereby
"sought to stem the tide ... of... undocumented alien[s]" by sub-
jecting employers to both civil and criminal penalties.8 8 IRCA also
prohibited undocumented aliens from using falsified documenta-
tion to gain employment-exactly what Castro had done in Hoff-
man Plastic Compounds.89 Together, it was now "impossible for
an undocumented alien to obtain employment in the United
States without some party directly contravening explicit congres-
sional policies."' IRCA was a significant change because the im-
migration statute at issue in Sure-Tan-the INA-was seen as
83. Id.
84. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 140 (2002).
85. See id. at 151-52.
86. Id. at 147 (quoting INS v. Nat'l Ctr. for Immigrants' Rights, Inc., 502 U.S. 183,
194, and n.8 (1991)).
87. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(2) (2000).
88. McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc., 498 U.S. 479, 481 (1991); see also L. Tracy
Harris, Note, Conflict or Double Deterrence? FLSA Protection of Illegal Aliens and the Im-
migration Reform and Control Act, 72 MINN. L. REV. 900, 922 n.106 (1988) (quoting H.R.
REP. NO. 99-682(I), at 46 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5650 ("Employers will be
deterred by the penalties in this legislation from hiring unauthorized aliens and this...
will deter aliens from entering illegally...
89. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324c(a) (2000).
90. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, 535 U.S. at 148.
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only dealing with the employment of illegal aliens as a peripheral
concern, 91 while the "IRCA 'forcefully' made combating the em-
ployment of illegal aliens central to '[tihe policy of immigration
law."'92 The level of congressional commitment to the policies un-
derlying IRCA was also seemingly stronger than to those of the
NLRA.93 While the NLRA specifically precludes punitive remedies
or other such sanctions to achieve industrial peace,94 the IRCA
employs the threat of "[sitrong employer sanctions" to "turn off
the job magnet that encourages people to enter the United States
illegally."5 This includes fines of up to $10,000 per incident for
employers who "knowingly" hire undocumented workers.96
Clearly, the availability of a $10,000 fine stands in stark contrast
to the NLRA's routine remedies of mitigated compensatory back-
pay and notice posting.
Following Hoffman Plastic Compounds, the lack of backpay as
an available remedy creates a problem that is "even more severe
for undocumented workers." 7 As the dissent in Hoffman Plastic
Compounds noted, "[wlithout the possibility of the deterrence
that backpay provides, the Board can impose only future-oriented
obligations upon law-violating employers-for it has no other
weapons in its remedial arsenal."' While compensatory backpay
may remain a weak remedy, it is necessary because "it helps
make labor law enforcement credible" and "makes clear that vio-
lating the labor laws will not pay."99 Further, "in the absence of
the backpay weapon, employers could conclude that they can vio-
late the labor laws at least once with impunity."100 Unfortunately,
91. See De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 359-60 (1976).
92. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, 535 U.S. at 147 (quoting INS v. Nat'l Ctr. for Immi-
grants' Rights, Inc., 502 U.S. 183, 194, and n.8 (1991) (alteration in original)).
93. See 132 CONG. REC. H31,640-41 (daily ed. Jan. 21, 1986) (statement of Rep. Bry-
ant).
94. Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7, 9-12 (1940).
95. 132 CONG. REC. H31,640 (daily ed. Jan. 21, 1986) (statement of Rep. Bryant).
However, an undocumented alien does not actually violate IRCA where an employer
knowingly hires him or her without the employee offering fraudulent documentation.
96. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1), (e)(4) (2000).
97. Roth, Worker's Freedom, supra note 53, at 41.
98. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 154 (2002) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
99. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
100. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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even in the face of this "backpay weapon" employers have largely
reached the same conclusion.1"'
What is disturbing about the decision in Hoffman Plastic Com-
pounds is that while the employer did not knowingly violate im-
migration law, it did knowingly violate labor law.0 2 Regardless,
the Supreme Court's decision essentially gave the employer a
pass as to the NLRA violation based on the cited need to support
the underlying policies of immigration law. Despite Chief Justice
Rehnquist's "significant sanctions," the result is that the worker
suffers while the employer is left unscathed despite its unlawful
behavior. As Orrin Baird aptly observed, "a cease and desist order
and a notice posting five years (and not enforced for twelve years)
after the union's organizing drive is pretty close to getting off
scot-free!" °3
E. Contempt Sanctions
Contempt sanctions remain perhaps the most powerful weapon
available to effectuate national labor policy.104 However, they are
issued by the courts, not the NLRB, and only become available af-
ter the procedural mechanisms of the NLRA are first ex-
hausted.0 5 Further, although court orders that enforce a Board
order carry the threat of contempt, this sanction is easily avoided
by an employer with the sophistication to comply with the letter
of the NLRA while shirking the obvious purposes underlying it. 06
For example, because the term "good faith" is open to varying in-
terpretations, the NLRB has instituted a per se test.07 Until a
subjective test is used, an employer may easily comply with the
letter of the law but fail to negotiate in good faith.'0°
101. See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
102. See id. at 140.
103. Orrin Baird, Undocumented Workers and the NLRA: Hoffman Plastic Compounds
and Beyond, 19 LAB. LAW. 153, 159 (2003).
104. See Hoffman Plastic Compounds, 535 U.S. at 152 ("This threat of contempt sanc-
tions ... provides a significant deterrent against future violations of the [NLRA].") (altera-
tions in original) (quoting Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 904 n.13 (1984)).
105. See id.
106. See Thomas B. Romer, "Negotiate in Good Faith as to What?" An Analysis of the
Good Faith Negotiation Clause of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 69 U. COLO. L. REV.
257, 282 (1998); see also 78 CONG. REC. S3679 (1934) (statement of Sen. Wagner).
107. See Romer, supra note 106, at 273.
108. See id. at 282.
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F. Attorneys' Fees
Awards of attorneys' fees are usually unavailable in labor cases
under the "American Rule."109 However, they are occasionally or-
dered in extraordinary circumstances and in such cases may pro-
vide a significant economic deterrent.110 Unfortunately, the delay
between the time an unfair labor practice is committed and when
such an award is ultimately issued can easily exceed a decade."'
Although the NLRA disallows many delay tactics, "the penalties
are so weak and legalistic tactical delays so debilitating to the un-
ion that a growing number of employers" use them."2
IV. RECOMMENDED CHANGES TO THE NLRA
A. The Need for Change
The current enactment of the NLRA"' is remarkably similar to
the original Wagner Act of 1935 1 despite major changes in the
industrial landscape of the United States. Although significant
anti-labor changes were made by the 1947 Taft-Hartley amend-
ments'1 5 to balance labor unions' rising strength, as well as other
minor changes by the Landrum-Griffin Act of 1959,11' the avail-
able remedies under the Act have not changed significantly since
its inception. While "the Act has been faulted for its paltry and
easily delayed remedies," legislative efforts to fix the problem
have been largely unsuccessful."
7
109. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 245, 247, 258-59
(1975) (discussing the American Rule and exceptions where there has been bad faith).
110. See Int'l Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. NLRB, 502 F.2d 349, 351-55
(D.C. Cir. 1974).
111. H. K Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 100 (1970) (noting that the "delay of over
eight years is not because the case is exceedingly complex, but appears to have occurred
chiefly because of the skill of the company's negotiators in taking advantage of every op-
portunity for delay").
112. Marshall, supra note 54, at 839.
113. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (2000).
114. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449
(1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169).
115. Labor-Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, Pub. L. No. 78-101, 61 Stat. 136
(1947).
116. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act of 1959, Pub.
L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (1959) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).
117. Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV.
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This legislative inaction may be partially explained by the po-
litical dissonance between labor and management-the original
evil that was sought to be cured by the NLRA. Because "the em-
ployment relation is one of the important human relationships"11
it is understandable that organized labor and employers would
strongly oppose any efforts supporting the other's agenda. "Em-
ployers are fighting for flexibility and managerial preroga-
tives.., while unions are fighting for their very existence in the
face of aggressive managerial resistance and long-term attri-
tion."1 9 While neither side normally commands the necessary ma-
jority of support needed to enact revisions to the NLRA, both
sides are routinely capable of stalling legislation through filibus-
ters and presidential vetoes.12 ° The result is that the current en-
actment of the NLRA is opposed by labor and management and
desperately in need of consequential reform."12
With industrial tranquility remaining out of reach and the de-
bate "unusually polarized" the question is begged: What is the
Nation's current commitment to realizing the intentions of the
NLRA? 22 Professor Cynthia L. Estlund has opined that "[t]he un-
derenforcement of labor's basic rights, and the political inertia in
the face of that underenforcement, may reflect ambivalence about
the wrongfulness of anti-union discrimination."'23 It may simply
not be the will of the people or of Congress to protect workers by
providing meaningful remedies under the Act. This theory is sup-
ported by the lessons of both Sure-Tan and Hoffman Plastic
Compounds-where the policies underlying national labor law
meet resistance from other congressional efforts, the NLRA will
be trumped.'24
Regardless of the reasons that the most basic rights of workers
have not been supported, the explanation for many employers'
continued violations of the NLRA are crystal clear-rational be-
1527, 1537 (2002).
118. James Atleson, Confronting Judicial Values: Rewriting the Law of Work in a
Common Law System, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 435, 436 (1997).
119. Estlund, supra note 117, at 1543.
120. See id. at 1540.
121. See David Masud, Management Criticisms of NLRB Power, 2001 L. REV. M.S.U.-
D.C.L. 1069, 1070-71 (2001) (analyzing the NLRA's inadequate remedies, how the NLRA
is not complied with, and the role of employers).
122. Estlund, supra note 117, at 1542-43.
123. Id at 1557.
124. See Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 144-52 (2002); Sure-
Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 891-94 (1984).
20041 1089
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
havior. Unfair labor practices are "devastatingly effective in hob-
bling organizational campaigns" and employers will continue to
"engage in serious and pervasive unfair labor practices" until it is
no longer profitable for them to do so.'25 In essence, the current
remedies available under the NLRA send a clear message to labor
and management that protecting workers' rights is not impor-
tant. And if something's hardly worth doing, it's hardly worth do-
ing right.
This appalling message creates a paper tiger out of the NLRA
and defeats its purpose from the outset. Just as Hoffman Plastic
Compounds showed, the "gap between undocumented workers'
rights and remedies creates a perverse incentive for unscrupulous
employers to seek out these workers, undermining not just labor
policy but immigration goals as well."'26 The gap between the
need for meaningful remedies and those available under the
NLRA has also rendered the Act ineffective and encouraged un-
scrupulous employers to abuse their employees--documented or
not.
B. Broader Remedies
While the following suggested remedies are not without their
own legitimate criticisms, they are necessary to fulfill the NLRA's
mission. Regardless of what protections are ultimately afforded to
workers under the NLRA, the remedies provided by the Act must
be sufficient enough to satisfy those purposes.
1. Consequential Damages
The first needed change to the NLRA is the addition of conse-
quential damages as an available remedy where an employee has
been discriminated against in violation of the Act. Elsewhere, one
who breaches a contract is "entitled to a credit against liability for
any consequential damages the plaintiff could have avoided or
minimized by reasonable effort and expense, whether or not the
125. Page, NLRB Remedies, supra note 17; see also PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING THE
WORKPLACE: THE FUTURE OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAw 111-14 (Harvard Univ. Press
1990) (reviewing studies correlating an increase in unfair labor practices with the decline
in union election successes).
126. Lori A. Nessel, Undocumented Immigrants in the Workplace: The Fallacy of Labor
Protection and the Need for Reform, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 345, 348 (2001).
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plaintiff actually avoided or minimized such damages."'27 How-
ever, the NLRA has been interpreted to disallow these conse-
quential damages based on a mistaken notion that since "the
NLRA's goal is the achieving of workplace peace.., neither labor
nor management should be too harshly penalized." 2 ' Mistaken
cries of "can't we all just get along" simply fail to recognize that
an unlawfully discharged worker will often lose far more than
merely wages. For example, such a worker could suffer "charges
stemming from the foreclosure on his mortgage, compensation for
damage to his credit rating, and closing costs and related
amounts necessary for him to secure a new home on similar
terms to the one he had lost" all because of the discriminatory
termination of his employment. 129 Compensation for losses actu-
ally realized due to an employer's unfair labor practice is not an
overly harsh penalty-it is an imperative remedy. 3 °
If consequential damages were allowed, an aggrieved employee
would truly be made whole and employers would be less inclined
to violate the NLRA. Former General Counsel Leonard Page be-
lieves that "both the language and legislative history of Section
10(c) of the Act are broad enough" to authorize the Board to direct
such "a remedy for all economic consequences that directly and
foreseeably result from an employee's unlawful discharge.''
Congress should ensure that there is no question that this was,
and remains, its intention.
2. Compound Interest
Complementing consequential damages is the needed remedy
of compound interest. 3 2 This remedy is necessary to allow back-
pay awards to be calculated cognizant of the "time value" of
money.'33 While simple interest is included in backpay awards
that exceed three months, "[t]he Board's remedial orders do not
127. 1 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 3.9 (2d ed. 1993).
128. Howard C. Eglit, Damages Mitigation Doctrine in the Statutory Anti-
Discrimination Context: Mitigating its Negative Impact, 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 7, 10-11 (2000).
129. Page, Recent Trends, supra note 23, at 58.
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provide for the compounding of interest on monetary awards."134
This creates an economic incentive to prolong a case that could be
settled because the actual value of any award that an employer
may eventually be forced to pay out will decrease over time once
the time value of that money is calculated. For example, a viola-
tive employer could invest the very funds that would be awarded
to aggrieved employees pending appeal. Even if that employer
was eventually forced to pay, the value of the award would have
been mitigated by the return on investment.
3. Punitive Damages with a Private Right of Action
The role of deterrence is essential to effectively amending the
NLRA and punitive damages, and a private right of action should
be allowed where an employee is discriminated against based on
anti-union animus.
Currently, while "the Board may exercise a broad discretion in
fashioning remedies to require an employer to undo the effects of
its own unlawful conduct and to effectuate the policies of the
Act... the Board has no power simply to punish the employer." 35
While section 10(c) of the NLRA "permits the Board to require an
employer who has committed an unfair labor practice" 36 to order
reinstatement with backpay, it only allows those compensatory
damages to be paid to aggrieved individuals and prohibits puni-
tive damages. 37 This results in the current situation where notice
posting and cease and desist orders are known to be an abysmal
deterrent of employer unfair labor practices and yet "fully com-
pensatory remedies, including attorneys' fees and exemplary
damages in egregious cases" are unavailable. 38
134. Id.
135. NLRB v. Bush Hog, Inc., 405 F.2d 755, 759 (5th Cir. 1968).
136. Southern S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31, 46 (1942).
137. The NLRA requires that where the Board finds that a person has committed an
unfair labor practice, the Board "shall issue .. .an order requiring such person to cease
and desist from such unfair labor practice, and to take such affirmative action including
reinstatement of employees with or without back pay." 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (2000); see also
Stephen F. Befort, Labor and Employment Law at the Millenium: A Historical Review and
Critical Assessment, 43 B.C. L. REV. 351, 373 (2002) (explaining that "[tihe NLRA does not
provide for fines, punitive damages, or any other 'penalty,' and the discharged employee is
subject to a duty to mitigate losses by finding alternative work").
138. Estlund, supra note 117, at 1555.
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By allowing punitive damages with a private right of action the
NLRA would be enforced through individual lawsuits rather than
the "overtaxed" NLRB."' Additionally, expensive litigation costs
would serve as a deterrent to unfair labor practices and encour-
age employers to strive to avoid lawsuits. The employer would
thereby be encouraged to create industrial peace and tranquility
as a cost-saving measure in full alignment with the intentions
underlying the NLRA.
Punitive damages should also be made available regardless of
the employee's immigration status, alleviating the dilemma en-
countered in Hoffman Plastic Compounds.4 ° There, the Court
was faced with how to enforce a backpay remedy under the NLRA
without tacitly condoning the undocumented worker's unlawful
employment."' The Court noted, "[s]ince the Board's inception,
we have consistently set aside awards of reinstatement or back-
pay to employees found guilty of serious illegal conduct in connec-
tion with their employment.""' While recognizing the rub be-
tween the NLRA and IRCA, the majority explained that the
NLRB had not "been commissioned to effectuate the policies of
the Labor Relations Act so single-mindedly that it may wholly ig-
nore other and equally important [clongressional objectives."'43
The majority rationally feared that awarding backpay would
"trivialize[]... immigration laws" and "condone[] and encourageD
future violations."' The dissent strongly contested this, pointing
out that backpay does not "'run[] counter to' or 'trench[] upon' na-
tional immigration policy" 45 because "aliens enter the country 'in
the hope of getting a job,' not gaining 'the protection of our labor
laws.""46 While the dissent's argument as to undocumented
aliens' intentions is undoubtedly true, it fails to recognize that
the Court would be in the unenviable position of rewarding the
perpetrator of a fraud were it to award backpay-an unacceptable
139. See id.
140. See Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002); see also supra
notes 69-92 and accompanying text.
141. See Hoffman Plastic Compounds, 535 U.S. at 149-52.
142. Id. at 143.
143. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Southern S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31, 47
(1942)).
144. Id. at 150.
145. Id. at 153 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 147, 149). Justices Stevens,
Souter, and Ginsberg joined in Justice Breyer's dissent. Id.
146. Id. at 155 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Patel v. Quality Inn S., 846 F.2d 700,
704 (11th Cir. 1988).
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outcome despite the Court's duty to support the policies underly-
ing the NLRA.
The availability of punitive damages would have solved this
problem by allowing damages to be imposed without awarding
them to Castro. These funds could also be used to compensate
third parties who are subjected to unfair labor practices but are
never compensated because their former employer goes out of
business or is otherwise unable to pay. Alternatively, these funds
could be used to help fund NLRB investigations into unfair labor
practice charges, relieving taxpayers of this burden.
By imposing punitive damages regardless of the employee's le-
gal status the employer would no longer be immunized by an em-
ployee's unclean hands. With the reality that "some of the jobs be-
ing generated in America's growing economy are jobs American
citizens are not filling,"'47 the need to remove an incentive for
mistreating undocumented aliens and Americans alike is compel-
ling.
V. CONCLUSION
Former Republican Senator of Massachusetts Edward W.
Brooke once said that "a right without a remedy is like a bell
without a clapper-hollow and empty."14 Unfortunately, this is
precisely what the promises of the NLRA have become. The
NLRA must not be allowed to "'hold out promises to the employee,
harass and impoverish the employer, enrich the lawyers, and clog
the legal machinery. '149
While labor activists have criticized the Supreme Court for its
decision in Hoffman Plastic Compounds,5 ° the Court was abso-
lutely correct in acknowledging that "any 'perceived deficienc[y]
in the NLRA's existing remedial arsenal' must be 'addressed by
147. President George W. Bush, Remarks by the President on Immigration Policy (Jan.
7, 2004), at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/01/20040107-3.html (last vis-
ited Mar. 29, 2004).
148. George E. Curry, Fair Housing Next on Civil Rights Map, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 28,
1988, at 4M.
149. William R. Corbett, Waiting for the Labor Law of the Twenty-First Century: Every-
thing Old is New Again, 23 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 259, 275 (2002) (quoting Clyde W.
Summers, Labor Law as the Century Turns: A Changing of the Guard, 67 NEB. L. REV. 7,
18 (1988)).
150. See Baird, supra note 103, at 159.
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congressional action,' not the courts."'5 ' In short, judicial restraint
is a duty, not an option. 15 2 Congress must ensure that its inten-
tions are realized by giving the NLRA the necessary tools to do its
job and avoid the "legal snare" of creating "[a] right without a
remedy."'53 To be sure, judicial restraint will only be practiced by
the Court and respected by society when Congress lives up to its
end of the bargain.
The old adage that "if something's worth doing, it's worth doing
right" should guide the needed legislative reform. Protecting em-
ployees' rights and encouraging industrial peace and tranquility
is just as important now as it was in 1935. It is worth doing right
and worth doing now.
Robert M. Worster, III
151. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 152 (2002) (alteration in
original) (quoting Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 904 (1984)).
152. See, e.g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 128 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("The
awesome power of this Court to invalidate.., legislation, because in practice it is bounded
only by our own prudence in discerning the limits of the Court's constitutional function,
must be exercised with the utmost restraint.").
153. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Columbia Gas Transmission Corp., 455 So. 2d 1260, 1264 n.2
(La. Ct. App. 1984).
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